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Appellants respectfully submit this Reply Brief in
;ii 3 '>1er

to the four briefs filed by respondents.

POINT I
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL OF THIS CASE
It is a fundamental aspect of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, enunciated in appellant's original brief,

that before summary judgment can be granted there can be no
jisputed facts which, if taken in the light most favorable to the
?arty against whom the summary judgment is urged, would result in
a decision favorable to that party.
Although this point was fully noted in the first brief
filed by appellants, the respondents have filled their briefs
with "facts" which the respondents have construed in their own
:avor.

If those "facts" were construed against the respondents,

as they should be in determining whether summary judgment should
oe

granted, it is clear that appellants would prevail in this

?articular case.
For example, in the brief of respondents Tenny and
'!alley Bank on pages 2, 3, and 9 reference is made to the "fact"
:hat everyone knew "the entire property" of the Blodgetts was
tncluded in the trust deed.

On page 9 of their brief,

cespondents bank and Tenney cite that part of the deposition of
' 0

s. Purcell in which she is repeating a statement allegedly made
the bank officer at the closing.

She claimed that the

.Jygtts were told that if the loan was not paid, they would be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"in danger of losing all of your property."

Not onlJ is that

statement contradicted by what the Blodgetts said occurred at
':hat closing, but also in its very nature it is a most ambigu 0 ,.s
statement.

If the statement "all of your property" really meant

every bit of property which the Blodgetts owned at the time,

the~.

it was in error since they owned other properties to which none
of the respondents make any claim.

Even though appellants

question that such a statement was made to them, nevertheless i:
could be construed as meaning "all" of the car wash property.
Actually the statement quoted by respondents is best explained b;
that portion of the deposition respondents (for obvious reasons)
chose not to quote:
A. He told them, he said, "Now you
understand that if this is not paid, you
are in danger of losing all of your
property?"
Q.

He said that?

A.

Yes sir, he said that.

Q. Did he say what property they were
in danger of loSing?

A.

No.

Betty Purcell Martsch Deposition, page 43.

(Emhasis added.)

Again on page 6 of respondent Martsch's brief it is
alleged that the Blodgetts were advised by the

respondent bank

that they were in peril of losing both the car wash property and
the grocery store property.

Not only is this statement contest~

strongly by the Blodgetts, but also it is not even a fact which
has been established

by any of the parties.

The bank itself

does not contend that it made such a statement to the Blodgettc.
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The Blodgetts' action in paying the remainder of the
-~ney
,-_- 1

owing on the first mortgage on the store property is clear

dence that they were never advised the note in default covered

:~e

grocery store property.

In other words, the only way the

cespondents can get to the position they are advocating before
:~is

Court is not only to take the facts in the light most

ravorable to them but also to put in "facts" which were not in
3ny

way established below.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to

~pellants

it is clear that the lease between Raco and the

3lodgetts referred only to the car wash property and in fact was
specifically limited to the car wash property.

Further, the

3lodgetts were not the parties securing the loan and, in any case
is defined by the lease, were not the ones who would have to come

;p with any additional security if any security was necessary.
~reover,

as explained in appellants' first brief, the loan

focuments do not in any way reflect a requirement by the loan
:ommittee of the respondent bank to obtain the store property of
the Blodgetts as additional security.
It is indeed very strange conduct for a reputable bank
:o deal as the respondents now claim that it in fact dealt.

The

,Jan was presented to the bank on the basis of the subordination
:f the car wash property and nothing else.
;~~raisal

There is no separate

for the store property and the only current appraisal

' the loan file was that of the car wash property.

There is no

''ference in the loan committee documents to additional
_;ateral.

The only indication of the positionn now taken by
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respondents is the self-serving statement of Mr.Throndson.

H~

claims that the loan committee required additional security and
would

~ot

property.

make the loan on the basis of just the car wash
But the tangible evidence does not support that

posit ion.
It is most unusual that the respondent bank, having
before it a lease document which limited the subordination to the

car wash property and which subordination was made by people who
were not seeking the loan, would then turn around and then insist
that such people provide additional property as security.
Stranger still is the claim that all of this was done without the
bank even talking to the people whose property it sought to
include as security.

On top of that the the request for more

security would have been in direct contravention of the lease
document in the possession of the bank.

Moreover, the land which

the bank allegedly insisted it had to have as additional
collateral was worth many times the value of the car wash
property and itself over three times the value of the loan being
obtained.
It is so ludicrous as to be beyond any reasonable
construction of the facts to believe that the respondent bank
ever intended the store property to be subordinated as additional
security. And since it is such a ridiculous position of the bank
to be taking at this time, certainly it is sufficient to merit a
review by a trier of fact.

When this case is reviewed in the

light most favorable to appellants, the rules of law demand tr.a:
this case be submitted for trial.
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The case against respondents bank and Tenney is
ictually quite simple when viewed in the light most favorable to
,coellants.
~,roperty

The bank had no intention of including the store

with the car wash property since that was not even under

)iscussion by the loan committee.

As the deposition of Mr.

Throndson makes clear, the bank added the Blodgetts' name at the
\ast moment not realizing that it was the Blodgetts rather than
:\aco Car Wash who even owned the property.
1

Then when the

documents were being prepared, it is very likely that the person
preparing the same misunderstood the instructions of Mr.
Throndson and put down the Blodgetts as co-signers.
~mitted

Throndson

that this was an error.
The store property description was most likely added in

order to get a description of the property over which a right of
•ay would be passing.
~o

Certainly, if the bank intended to have

parcels of land included in the document as both being

security for the trust note, it would have been more specific in
tne description of the property in the trust deed.

The fact that

:irst Security Bank of Idaho in drawing up its trust deed with
'ir. Martsch numbered the parcels 1 and 2 is evidence that that

oank saw an ambiguity in the trust deed drawn up by respondent
oank,
The Blodgetts were never told that the store property
~s

included because it was never intended to be included.

On

:ce other hand, if it was intended to be included, then it was
:,audulent conduct on the part of the bank to deceptively hide
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its intention from the Blodgetts.

Either way the conduct of tho

bank was in violation of a duty owed to the Blodgetts.
Respondents argue that somehow

becaus~

the Blodgetts

used an attorney at one time or another and because they

recebe~

a copy of the default notice, that that put them on notice of the
claim now made by respondents that the store property was
included as part of the trust deed.

Quite to the contrary, the

bank continually made representations through Mr. Tenney and
others that the bank did not intend on taking any of the
Blodgetts' property in default and hoped that there would be

so~

way to resolve the matter so that the Blodgetts could get the car
wash property back.

Never at any time did the bank ever suggest

in their dealings with the Blodgetts that the store property was
in jeopardy.

In fact the bank continually assured the Blodgetts

that it would make an effort to get the car wash property back to
the Blodgetts.

Therefore, at the time of the sale, the Blodgetts

fully expected the bank to protect them.

In any case, it is

clear from their conduct and the conduct of the bank towards them
that there was never any intention that the store property would
be included in the sale or that the Blodgetts had any notice of
the same.
Since the bank and Mr. Tenney seemed so concerned about
the Blodgetts not losing the car wash property, certainly had
they any intention that the store property was included in the
transaction they would have or should have warned the Blodgetts
of that fact.

None of the respondents can point to anything

other than the default notice to suggest any such warning.
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Respondents treat this case as though there had been a
:nal on the facts and that the facts should now be construed in
, manner most favorable to them.
-~.e

This is obviously not the case.

such claim made by all respondents is that because the

Blodgetts used an attorney to draw the lease with the Raco Car
·.~ash

and consulted the same attorney from time to time

thereafter, that somehow that transforms itself into the fact
that they should be on notice as to any defects in the documents
were signed by them.

1hich

The fact of the matter is that the

attorney did not attend the closing, did not attend the trust
ieed sale and was used by the Blodgetts only on a sporadic basis.
~hus

there is no evidence that the Blodgetts were ever on notice

~at

the store property was to be sold at the trust deed sale.

POINT II
RESPONDENT MARTSCH WAS NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE.
It is argued by respondent Martsch that he was a bona
fide purchaser for value.
~en

The facts of the case, particularly

viewed in the light most favorable to the appellants, do not

~rnit

such a construction of his position.

At the time of the

sale Joe Marts ch was according to the records a creditor of Raco
:ar Wash by reason of a loan to Raco Car Wash for the completion
:f

the structures on the property.

~~sition,

Exhibit 3)

(Betty Purcell Marts ch

Lorin Pace, who apparently bid in at the

:ale on behalf of Joe Martsch, was the secretary of Raco Car
'ash.

(Pace Deposition, Page 3) Betty Purcell who had the power

' attorney from Joe Martsch was the president and principal
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shareholder of Raco Car Wash.

Because of the significant amount

of money Martsch is said to have loaned the company, and because
he received as security shares of the company, he could well bP
considered to be the principal owner of Raco after the loan.
Certainly his contribution to the company was much greater than
that of the alleged principal, Betty Purcell, and was not secured
by anything other than the company itself.
Martsch Deposition, page 48.)

Betty Purcell

Also at the time of the sale Betty

Purcell and Joe Martsch were common law husband and wife.
It was precisely because Raco Car Wash defaulted on its
note with the bank that the property in question was sold at the
trustee sale.

Moreover, and probably as important, is the fact

that at the time of the trustee sale, if the store property was
really included in that sale it was by reason of negotiations or
agreements between the bank and the personnel connected with Raco
Car Wash.
Summing up, the people who were involved in the
purchase at the trustee sale, i.e., Joe Martsch, Betty Purcell,
and Lorin Pace, were individuals who had active or constructive
notice that the store property was not to be included in the
trust deed as far as the Blodgetts were concerned.

They also

knew or should have known that the value of the store property
far outweighed the value of any amount outstanding on the loan
Raco Car Wash had taken with the bank.
If in fact the store property was sold at the trustee
sale, which claim is disputed in this lawsuit, Joe Martsch had
actual or constructive notice that the Blodgetts never intenrlec
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

e same and that it was contrary to their agreement with Raco.

'.ortsch knew at the time of the sale that the car wash property
::uld be sold to the State of Utah at a figure more than the
nount owed to the bank.

(Joe Martsch Deposition, page 15) He

·•as therefore bidding in on the sale to recover his investment to
Raco.

(Id.) In other words, he knew that just the car wash

croperty itself was sufficient to cover the loan to the bank.
That being the case, he knew that if the store property was
included that would be a clear windfall.

Under such

circumstances Joe Martsch was not a bona fide purchaser for value
the store property.

~

POINT III
RESPONDENTS ASHWORTH AND THE STATE OF UTAH ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Respondent Ashworth claims that the incorrect legal
~scription

and the lack of posting as required by the law did

1ot substantially affect the conditions of the sale.
:~e

case.

~~le

That is not

Otherwise how does one justify the fact that the only

in attendance at the sale were those who were intimately

:Mnected with the original bank loan, namely the bank, the
3lodget ts and the officers of Raco Car Wash.
:otential purchaser at the sale.

There was no other

Yet it is now claimed by all of

:ce respondents that the store property, worth in excess of
::00,000 as well as the car wash property, itself worth more than

··e $30,000 paid, was included in that sale.

There are too many

'Bin hunters in the State of Utah who are looking for
'.lent investments to believe that the legal description
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difficulties and the lack of the posting did not affect the
number of purchasers at the sale.

As noted above, respondent

Martsch certainly knew of the bargain of the car wash property bv
itself.

Moreover, the lack of potential purchasers at the sale

is further evidence that no reasonable person who looked at that
sale notice believed that it included any more property than the
car wash property.

Appellant should be given the opportunity at

trial to present testimony along this line.
The first brief of appellants answers the arguments of
the State of Utah.

The State required a quit-claim deed from

Raco and Purcell even though they had no claim to the property.
The State also had had negotiations with Purcell even before the
sale.

(Betty Purcell Martsch Deposition, page 82.) Hence the

State by its action showed that it knew of potential or real
defects in the title to the property.

Opportunity should be

given appellants to establish their claim against the State in
Court.

SUMMARY
This case is a very complex one and cries out to be
tried by a jury.

There are questions of fact strewn through the

entire record which, if resolved in favor of the Blodgetts, would
with almost any one of them result in a verdict favorable to the
Blodgetts.

The conduct of the bank and of Tenney in their

dealings with the Blodgetts show either the greatest of frauds
perpetrated on long-time customers who relied on their dealina;
with the bank for guidance and assistance or else show that tnc
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:Jnk had no intention of ever having more than the car wash
~roperty

as the security for the loan made to Raco Car Wash.

s 1 th er way, the bank and Tenney have a res pons ibil i ty to the
31odgetts which should be answered in damages.
~artsch

Respondent

was privy to and participated in a scheme whereby in all

likelihood he had no intention of acquiring anything other than
the car wash property at the trustee sale since the profit from
that alone would be great.

If he thought that the store property

was included, he purchased it with full knowledge that that the
Blodgetts had no intention of having their store property so
included.

He also was aware that the amount of money being

offered at the sale was so disproportionate to receiving both the
car wash and the store properties as to be unconscionable.
~spondent
~

Ashworth failed to follow the good practices outlined

statute in advertising the sale, in describing the property,

,nd in conducting the sale both in the way it was offered to
those who were to participate as well as the way it was postponed
for a full day in which to accommodate the purchasers.

'

~

,

~eason

The State

Utah was put on notice that there was defect in the title by
of its insistence on a quit claim deed and by reason of

other dealings with Purcell and Martsch.
All of the above adds up to one important fact, namely
:nat th is case has not had an opportunity to be tried before a
:rier of fact.

There are many questions that need to be

ietermined and they can be determined properly only before a
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jury.

It was improper for the lower court to have granted the

summary judgment.

This case should be reversed and remanded to

the lower court for trial on the issues.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE,

BOYER~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

BOYLE

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I hand-delivered 2 copies of the

foregoing to the following on the 10th day of November, 1978:

Irvin H. Biele
so West Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondent
Valley Bank & Trust Company
and Karl W. Tenney
Harry D. Pugsley
310 South Main Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Resporrlent Joe Martsch
Donald Sawaya
2505 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84115
Attorney for Respondent Wayne A. Ashworth
Stephen J. Sorenson
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
Attorney for Respondent
State of Utah
~,

/

/I

I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

